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PRECAUTIONARY  SAVING  IN THE SMALL  AND IN THE LARGE 
ABSTRACT 
The theory  of precautionary  saving  is shown  in this paper to be 
isomorphic  to the Arrow-Pratt  theory  of risk aversion,  making  possible 
the application  of a large  body of knowledge  about  risk aversion  to 
precautionary  saving,  and more generally,  to the theory  of optimal choice 
under  risk.  In  particular,  a measure  of the strength  of precautionary 
saving motive  analogous  to the Arrow-Pratt  measure of risk  aversion is 
used to establish  a number  of new propositions  about  precautionary 
saving, and to give a new interpretation  of the Oreze-Modigliani  sub- 
stitution  effect. 
Miles  S. Kimball 
Department  of Economics 
University  of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, MI  48109 I. Introduction 
It has been  recognized  since Bernoulli  (1738) that risk aversion can be associated with concav- 
ity of utility functions. But it was not until Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) that it was recognized 
that the function z4iLl_or the related index  was an excellent measure of  risk aversion. 
Subsequently, the Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute and relative risk aversion have often demon- 
strated their usefulness in a wide range of both theoretical and empirical studies of  behavior under 
uncertainty.5  In  addition, the example of the Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion has spurred 
a considerable amount of research on other ways to characterize aspects of  risk aversion, such as 
Ross' (1981) work on a notion of "strongly more risk averse" or Pratt and Zeckhauser's (1987) work 
on "proper risk aversion." 
In the study of precautionary  saving, it has  been  known since Leland (1968) and Sandmo 
(1970) that precautionary saving in response to risk is associated with convexity of the marginal 
utility function, or a positive third derivative of  a von Neumann-Morgenstern  utility function. More 
generally, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) note that if an  individual's utility is a function of a control 
variable 8 and an exogenous random variable 9, so that he or she solves 
maxEV(9,8), 
using the first-order condition 
E  = 0, 
then if  is  convex in 9, increases in the variability of 9 will  result in increases in the optimal 
choice  of 8.  This  is  analogous to the fact that a concave utility function indicates risk aversion. 
However, unlike the theory of risk aversion, which lays out in considerable detail the determinants 
of the magnitude of the effects of risk on  ezpected  utility, the theory of the optimal response of 
decision variables to risk (which includes precautionary saving as a subcase) has not hitherto said 
much about the magnitude  of these responses.  Fortunately, as will  be  shown, this is an easily 
remedied deficiency,  since a straightforward reinterpretation of the mathematical theory yields an 
equally powerful theory of the optimal response of  decision variables to risk—and in particular,  a 
theory of  precautionary saving closely  analogous to the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion. 
Mathematically, the Acrow-Pratt index —v"(x)/v'(z) = a(x) is a good measure of risk aversion 
because given two  utility functions vs(x) and  v2(z),  ifai(x) > a2(x) for  all z,  then  vs(z) =  g(v2(z)) 
where  g()  is a  monotonically  increasing,  concave  function.2  If  v5 is thus a  concave  or  "risk  averse" 
The  References  include  many papers in this category. 
2  See Pratt  (lse4) for a proof. 
1 transformation of v2, then it can readily he shown that v1  implies  more risk averse behavior than 
V2 
Analogously, as  long  as  the cross-partial 82v(9,6) is uniformly positive or uniformly nega- 
tive, the index  — a 
V2(9s) 5)  = q(O, 6) is a good measure of the sensitivity  of the optimal 
choice of 6  to risk because (by the same mathematical result used above) given two indirect util- 
ity functions V1(9, 6)  and  1/3(9,6)  and a fixed  initial value of 6,  if sji(9, 6)  >  s(9,  6)  for all  9, 
then  = h (av;o)) where h)  is monotonically increasing and concave if Ot9,6) > 0  but 
convex  if  < 0.  If 8v,(&61  is thus a concave or convex transformation of dV,61  then in 
certain important senses detailed below, the indirect utility function V5 implies a different degree 
of  sensitivity of the optimal choice of 6 to risk than the indirect utility function V2 
If we give the name "prudence" to the sensitivity of the optimal choice of a decision  variable 
to risk, then  6)  is a measure of "absolute prudence," and 9 i(9, 6) is a measure  of "relative 
prudence," just as  a(x) is a measure of absolute risk aversion and  x a(x) is a measure of relative 
risk aversion.  The term "prudeuce" is meant to suggest the propensity to prepare and forearm 
oneself in the lace of uncertainty, in contrast  to "risk aversion," which is how much one  dislikes 
uncertainty and would turn away from uncertainty if one could.3 
Though the analogy between the theory of  risk aversion and the theory of the optimal response 
of decision  variables to risk is quite general, concreteness is especially important  in illustrating  a 
technique of reinterpretation.  The determination of precautionary saving is an example of  the effect 
of  risk on a decision variable that is not only simple, but also one that has considerable importance 
in its own right.  Therefore, after a few remarks on a general plane in Section II, establishing the 
usefulness of "prudence" as  a measure of the sensitivity of choices  to risk, we will turn to a deeper 
investigation of precautionary saving.4  Section III establishes the formal similarity between the 
theory of  precautionary saving in particular and the theory of  risk aversion. Section IV applies the 
most basic results about risk aversion to precautionary saving. Section V explores the consequences 
of decreasing, increasing or  constant absolute prudence in the context of precautionary  saving, 
including the effects of  uncertainty on the marginal propensity to consume out of  wealth.  Section 
VI briefly considers the consequences  of  facing more than one risk at a time. Section VII uses the 
concept of "prudence" to provide a novel interpretation of the Drkze-Modigliani  (1972) substitution 
effect  as the consequence  of the precautionary saving  motive being stronger than risk aversion in 
In different  contexts, "prudence"  will have different meanings.  In the paradigmatic  example of the consemption- 
saving decision  under uncertainty, "prudence"  represents  the intensity of the precautionary  saving mntive. 
Kimball  (1955a)  offers another, quite different, example of how the mathematical theory of risk aversion  can 
be used to study optimal  decisions  under risk. 
2 the case of  decreasing absolute risk aversion and weaker than risk aversion in the case of  increasing 
absolute risk aversion. Section VIII concludes the paper. 
H. Prudence as a Measure  of the Sensitivity of a Decision Variable  to Risk 
Four of the basic results in the theory of risk aversion involving risk premia can be  applied 
readily to any model of choice under uncertainty that falls under Rothschild and Stiglitz' (1971) 
general description. In order to state these results we must first define two concepts analogous to 
risk premia. 
Let a probability distribution for 9 be analyzed into 9 = 9o +  where 9 is a certain quantity 
and 6 is a random variable. Then we will call  an "equivalent precautionary premium" for 6 if it 
satisfies 




for some  5. If both sides of  (1) equal zero, then 55 satisfies the first order conditions for  an optimum 
for two different distributions of 9:  for 9 equal to 9o  — r  with certainty, and for 9 equal to the 
random variable ee + 6. If these first order conditions are also sufficient for an optimum, then the 
equivalent precautionary premium  is the certain reduction in 8 from the initial  value 8e  that has 
the same effect on the optimal value of  the decision  variable  as the addition of the random variable 
6; in both cases the optimal value of 6 changes from te = arg max5  V(8,  5) to 55. 
Similarly,  we will call '" a "compensating precautionary premium"5 for U if it satisfies 




If both sides of (2) equal zero---as  they  will  be  if 5e  is  defined  as at the end of the previous 
paragraph—and these first order conditions are sufficient for an optimum, then the compensating 
precautionary premium °  is the shift in the distribution of 9 that compensates  for the effect  of the 
random variable  8 on the optimal value of 5,6 
The parallel between these precautionary premia and  risk premia can be shown more clearly by 
Table 1.  Pratt's (1964) notation ir is used to denote an equivalent risk premium and 7r  to denote 
See Pope and Chavas  (1985) for a discusdon of the distinction between  equivalent  and cnmpensating risk 
premia, which are  analogous  to equivalent  and rompensating variations under certainty.  Pratt  (1964)  refers 
to this distinction in passing,  noting that the "asking price"  price of a risk  (the equivalent  risk premium) is 
different from the "bid price"  of a risk  (the compensating  risk premium). He refers  to the compensating  risk 
premium  as the "bid price"  of a risk. 
Compensation  for an effect on a decision  variable  should not be confused  with welfare compensation. The two 
often do not coincide,  as can be seen, for example, in Section VII on the  Dréze-Modigliani  substitution effect. 
3 a compensating risk premium.7 Table 1 shows the definitions of the precautionary premia for both 
the special case of precautionary saving, which will be addressed in the succeeding sections, and 
for the general case. 
Table 1 
Comparison of Risk and Precautionary  Premia 
Equivalent  Risk Premium  it  Compensating Risk Premium r 
E  v(x + .1) = v( 
— ir(2, x))  E  ri(z + I  + ir(I,  it)) = v(z) 
Equivalent  Precautionary  Premium  if'  Compensating Precautionary Premium 
(precautionary  saving case)  (precautionary  soving case) 
Ev'(s + y) = v'(s 
— ib(,s))  Ev'(s +  +  sf'5(ys)) = v'(s) 
(general case)  (general  case) 
EOV(90+9S)  &v(ao—4(O,es,5),s)  E3v(9o+0+9s5)5)  OV(9o,S) 
85  = 
85  85 
= 
85 
Note: In the arguments of  it, r, if', and if', the symbols I,  and 9 represent the entire distributions 
of I,  and 0, not particular realizations. 
The only difference between the definition of  a precautionary premium and the definition of the 
corresponding risk premium is in the substitution of marginal utility with respect to the decision 
variable for total utility.  Furthermore, given  our assumption that  &2V(9,5)  is either uniformly 
positive or uniformly negative over the relevant region, either  or  _.JC$ç5, considered as 
a function of 9,  is  a monotonically increasing function to which theorems about monotonically 
increasing utility functions can be applied. Since changing the sign of both sides of the definition of 
a precautionary premium leaves  an equivalent expression, the substitution of  or — for v and 
the substitution  of if' and lb* for it and ir  describes a complete isomorphism between statements 
about risk premia and statements about precautionary premia. 
Two of  the most important  theorems about equivalent risk premia can be found in John Pratt's 
(1964) brilliant article "Risk  Aversion in the Small and in the Large." The "risk aversion in the 
Throughout the paper, all formulas  involving  r, sw  and r  apply even  when the risks involved do not have 
zero means,  unless  stated otherwise.  However, when  S or 9 have non-zero  means,  'r, re  and b  must he 
interpreted as minus certainty equivalents or minus certainty compensations,  rather than as premia. 
4 small" of Pratt's title refers to the result that for a small mean-zero uncertainty E, the equivalent 
risk premium is 
—v"(x)  cr2  2  a2  2 
(3)  ir(,x)=  v'(x) 
where o(c) denotes a quantity  that approaches zero faster than o as cr  —s 0.  In an even more 
striking result, Pratt demonstrates that absolute risk aversion also indicates the intensity  of "risk 
aversion in the large" since given two utility functions v1 and v2, if v1 always has a higher measure 
of absolute risk aversion—that is, ai(x) = Z7 >  = a2(z) for all z—then the equivalent 
risk premium will always be greater for v1  than for 02 (ri(,x) > ,r2(2,z) for all z and i). This 
is a result of the fact  we noted above that if ai(z) > a2(x) for all z then  vj(x) is a concave 
transformation of vo(x). 
These two results are readily translated  into the language of  optimal choice under risk.  Por a 
small mean-zero uncertainty, U, the equivalent precautionary premium is 
03V(9, 5) 
(4)  4'(J,Oo,S) = 
02V(o,s) -  +o(a) = 
0985 
"In the large," if given two indirect utility functions V1 and V2 and a fixed initial  value of 5, if V1 
has a globally higher measure of absolute prudence than V2—that is, 
81/(9,5)  82 V2(9, 5) 
qi(9  5) 
—  pg2p  —  p9255  =  112(9,5) 
OuT/i(9,5)  82V2(9,5) 
0905  8905 
for all 9—then  the equivalent precautionary premium will be greater for V1 than for V2 
(5j1(U,90,5)  > b2(9,O,5) for all 9o and U). 
Pratt  (1964) mentions the concept of a compensating risk premium only in passing,9 but 
the statements  above apply to compensating risk premia and precautionary premia as well as to 
equivalent risk premia and precautionary premia. Appendix A shows that f(x) = x — ,r(i, x) and 
g(x) = r + lr(i,  x) are mutual inverses,10  so that for a small zero-mean risk i, 
x) = ir(E, x + ir(i, z)) 
—  2  = a(x + ir(z, x))—( + o(c5)) 
= a(x)-- + o(cfl, 
This is true both when  the cross  partials  are  positive  and when they are negative.  However,  it is 
essential that the cross partials have the same sign for both V5 and V2. 
See footnote 
These are  ordinary point-valued  functions, since  as  long  as the utility function is  monotonically  increasing, 
there is at most one possible valos for a risk premium. 
5 as long as absolute risk aversion a(s) is continuous. Furthermore, the fact that f(s) = a'  — r(2, x) 
and g(x) = a' + r,  x) are mutual inverses implies the following lemma: 
Lemma:  Let each utility functionbe  strictly increasing and continuous and let irs(2,  a'), ir(2, a'), 
7r2(z,  a') and ir(2, x) be the equivalent and compensating risk premia for two different utility func- 
tions, vs(x) and v2(a').  If irs(I,a') ￿  (>)ir2(2,a') for all a'  where both ir5(2,a') and ir2(2,a') exist 
and both exist for some value ofa',  then irT(i,a') ￿  (>)ir(2,a') for all a'  where both irç(2,a') and 
7r(z,a') exist. Similarly, for one utility function and two risks 2 and 22, if  ir(2s,a') ￿  (>)r(ia,a') 
for all a' where both exist, and both exist for some value of  a', then 1r(ks,  a') ￿  (>)ir(22, a') for all 
a' where both  exist.  Both statements are also true if the equivalent and compensating premia are 
interchanged. 
A proof is in Appendix A. As a consequence  of this lemma, not only only are equivalent and 
compensating risk premia approximately equal "in the small," but almost all significant qualitative 
results about equivalent risk premia are interchangeable with corresponding results about compen- 
sating risk premia, including the result the result about risk premia "in the large" discussed above. 
Furthermore, because of the close analogy between risk premia and precautionary premia, we can 
be confident that a result about equivalent precautionary premia will imply a corresponding result 
about compensating precautionary premia.15 
III. The Analogy Between Precautionary Saving and Risk Aversion 
From this point on, our discussion  will be  much more concrete, as we focus on the consumption- 
savings decision  under uncertalnty as a paradigmatic example of choice  under risk.  Establishing 
the formal correspondence between precautionary saving and risk aversion requires us to set out 
a simple model representing this consumption-savings  decision.  The simplest such model is one 
that has only two periods, in which a consumer  imbued with additively time-separable utility faces 
uncertaln labor income  in the second period.  This is the model  taken up here.  The extension to 
more than two periods is difficult, but important,  and is pursued in Kimball (1988b). The extension 
to the case of  nonseparable utility is relatively stralghtforward, but cumbersome, and is addressed 
in Appendix C. 
To further simplify the presentation, it will be assumed that the risk-free rate and other rates 
of return are exogenously fixed and that when an agent faces incomplete markets, the constralnt 
In the case of precautionary premia,  the assumption  of strict monotonicity  and cnntinnity in the  Lemma 
becomes  the assumption  thst LY& is a rontinuoss and either monotnnically  increasing sr mnnotonirally 
decreasing  function  ol U. 
- 
6 that an agent cannot borrow against  more than the minimum value of his or her human wealth 
is never binding except at the end of the last period of the agent's existence.  Since the interest 
rate is exogenously given,  it is easiest to calculate everything in present-value terms, so that we 
can,  without loss of generality, treat the real risk-free rate as if it were zero.  Finally, it will be 
assumed that labor supply is inelastic, so that labor income  can be treated as if it were manna 
from heaven.12  With the foregoing simplifications,  the consumer's decision problem is: 
max u(c)+Ev(wo—c+y), 
where  u  is the first  period utility function, c the first period consumption, E  an  expectation 
conditional on first-period information, v the second-period utility function,  w5  the consumer's 
initial assets plus his  first-period labor income (which  is received  before the first-period consumption 
decision  must be made) and p the second-period labor income. 
It will  be  convenient to write p =  + ,  dividing second-period  labor income p  into its 
expectation  and a mean zero risky component ,  and to define so = so0 + ,  adding mean second- 
period income  to initial assets to get the total of human and non-human wealth (which is what 
determines consumption in the case of certainty equivalence). We will also define  for later use 
=  so — c, the amount of "saving" out of total human and non-human wealth. The consumer's 
decision  problem can then be rewritten: 
maxu(c)+Ev(w-c+y). 
The first-order condition for (7) is 
u'(c) = E v'(sv 
— c + ). 
It is clear from this first-order condition that the risk  in second-period income will affect con- 
sumption in the first period only insofar as it affects second-period expected marginal utility.  The 
fact that expected marginal utility is unaffected by the addition of mean-zero risks  in the case of 
quadratic utility is what yields  certainty equivalence  in that case. Even when certainty equivalence 
does  not hold, if there is some quantity 1'  that can compensate for the effect of the risk  on 
second-period expected marginal utility—that is, a compensating precautionary premium satisfy- 
ing v'(w 
— c) = Ev'(w 
— c +  +  ), then first-period consumption would be unaltered  by the 
12  Despite the fact that labor supply is inelastic, twill  continue to refer to this income  as "labor income"  in order 
to distinguish it from  "capital income,"  which is determined  endogenously. 
7 addition of the risk  plus the tompensating precautionary premium .  Similarly,  if there is an 
equivalent precautionary premium  such that v'(w — c — )  = E  u'(w 
— c+  D), then  the elimination 
of the rik  at the cust to coitsumer of the certain quantity & would leave optimal first-period 
consumption unchanged. 
Interpreting the two precautionary premia in a slightly different way, the compensating pre- 
cautionary premium  &  shows how far the first-period consumption function will shift to the right 
at a given level of consumption, since it shows how much more wealth is needed to compensate for 
the effect of the risk on consumption.  Similarly,  the equivalent precautionary premium  shows 
the leftward shift of the consumption function that would result from elimination of the risk . 
Appendix B contains a demonstration of these two propositions. 
To place this model within the Rothschild-Stiglitz  framework used in Section II, we could write 
V(w + ü, c) = u(c) + v(w 
— c + u) 
Consumption  is the decision variable, so that c takes on the role of 8, while w has the role of 9e, 
the role of  U and to +  the role of  9 itself.'3 In place of  we have  = u'(c) 
— v'(u, 
— c+ ),  and in 
place of  we  have —v"(w — c + ),  which is always  positive. Because u'(c) is constant for a  fixed 
value of the decision  variable c, we can ignore this term in the definition of precautionary premia 
for this model.  Moreover, the term —v'(w 
— c + )  is a function of  c only through to — c = s, so that 
a precautionary premium for one combination of  consumption and wealth is also a precautionary 
premium for all other combinations of consumption and wealth involving the same level of "saving" 
s out of total expected human and nonhuman wealth. In particular, for a given value of  s, one can 
search out the combination of to and  c for which the first-order condition (8) is satisfied, allowing 
us to give an economic interpretation  to the precautionary premia for any value  of a. 
The analogy between the theory  of risk aversion and the theory of precautionary  saving is 
particularly simple. The negative of marginal utility —v' plays substantially the same role for pre- 
cautionary saving that the utility function itself plays for risk aversion. For example, concavity of v 
indicates risk aversion, while concavity  of —v' or v"(.) > 0 indicates a positive precautionary saving 
motive. As another example, the index of absolute prudence in this model, where it represents the 
strength of the precautionary saving motive, is 
(—v'(s)"  v"(s) 
(9)  pe,c) = ti(s)  (—v'(s))' 
= 
v"(s) 
It is becaese a has the role of 9 that the precautionary  premia show up here as additions and subtractions  to 
wealth. 
8 Thus, the analogy between absolute risk aversion and absolute prudence is especially obvious in this 
context. In general, virtually every theorem about risk aversion has an application to precautionary 
saving  by substituting  —si'  for v and making other appropriate adjustments.  We will proceed in 
exactly this way:  reinterpreting many of the most important  theorems about risk aversion as 
theorems about precautionary saving.14 
IV. Prudence as a Measure  of the Intensity  of the Precautionary Saving Motive 
Applying the results of Section II to precautionary saving, we find first that the increase in 
the wealth needed  to induce any given level of first-period consumption—or in other words, the 
rightward shift of the consumption function—due to a small risk is approximately q(s) = 
(where the total "saving" out of  human and nonhuman wealth s is also the mean of  second-period 
consumption) times half the variance of the risk.  Similarly,  the leftward shift of the consumption 
function due to the elimination of a small risk is approximately q(s) times half the variance of the 
risk. 
Second, given  two second-period  utility functions  v1 and v2, if  qj  (s) =  >  = i  (s) 
for all s, then 
's(Ths) > '2(Y,5) 
for all s and ,  and 
(Ths) > b(ü,s) 
for all s and ü•  Therefore, for points with the same amount of saving out of total human and non- 
human wealth s, the risk  in second-period labor income causes  a greater rightward shift of the 
consumption function for an individual with second-period utility v1 than one with second-period 
utility v2. If  the first-period utility functions are such that the consumption functions in the absence 
of the income risk  are identical (for example, if  szj(c) = lvs(Ac) and u2(c) =  *v2(Ac) so that the 
consumption functions are both linear, with slope j--) then points with the same saving and the 
same initial second-period  consumption also  have the same first-period consumption; therefore agent 
1 would react to  with a greater rightward shift of the whole curve representing the consumption 
function.  Similarly, the leftward shift of the consumption function  due to eliminating the risk 
is greater for agent  1  than for agent 2 at points with the same amount  of saving a.  If by chance 
14  am grateful to Leslie Young for suggesting  this way of proceeding. 
9 the consumption functions in the face  of the income  risk  are identical,'5 points with the same 
"saving"  and mean second-period consumption s have the same consumption c ss well, so that the 
whole graph of the consumption function shifts further left for agent 1 than for agent 2 when the 
income  risk is eliminated. 
In addition to applying the results of Section  II to precautionary saving, the simple structure 
of precautionary saving under  additively separable utility makes it possible to bring to bear the 
result of Arrow (1965) that a globally more risk-averse individual will choose to invest less in a 
risky security.  Formally,  Arrow states that if v is globally more risk averse than v2  (that is, 
ai(x) > as(x) for all x) then aj(i,x) .c a2(2,x) for all z, where 
(12)  oi(i,x)  =  argmaxEv1(x +  af), 
and 
(13)  a2(f,z)=  argmaxEv2(x+ai), 
As  Arrow (1965)  also makes clear, differentiating  twice with respect to a shows that expected utility 
is concave in a, and therefore that expected utility monotonically increases with a up to the point 
where the maximum is reached and monotonically decreases  thereafter. 
To make the application of the foregoing  result to precautionary saving, substitute  —v for c1 
and —t4 for v2 to find that if  ?)1(s) > m(8) for all x, then $i(,  3) c fl2(D, s), where 
(14)  /3i(Ths)=  argmaxE[—v(s+l3i)], 
and 
(15)  2(Y,5) = argmaxE[—t4(s+fiz)). 
How can this be interpreted?  Since 
(16)  —u'(c) = E [—v'(s +  /11)] 
for an individual allowed to freely choose his or her level of consumption and saving, the level 
of consumption corresponding to a given level of saving must be greatest for the value of $ that 
maximizes the right-hand side.  To look at things another way, since total human and non-human 
Note that this is different  than the consumption  two consumption  functions being the same  in the absence of 
risk, so the following statement is not just a trivial consequence of the preceding  one. 
10 wealth other than the risky asset /32 is equal to consumption plus saving (to = c + a), we can see 
that the wealth corresponding to a given level of saving is maximized by a lower value of /3 for 
agent 1 than for agent 2.  Graphically, the savings function at a given level of a begins to move 
leftward (implying an increased average propensity to save out of initial  wealth) at lower values of 
/3 for agent  1 than for agent 2. 
V. Decreasing, Increasing, or Constant Absolute Prudence 
Using the fact that a  (z) > a2(x) for all z implies greater global risk aversion for v1 than for 
v2, it is easy to show, as Pratt (1964) does, that diminishing absolute risk aversion(a(x)  > a(x+) 
for all x and all c > 0) implies  that the risk premium tr(i,x) always decreases with x.  One need 
only substitute into  the propositions above v5 (x) = v(x) and v2 (x) = v(z +  c) where  is any strictly 
positive number.  One also discovers by this exercise that r(2,z) is decreasing in x and that the 
optimal  amount of the risky security, a(2, z) is increasing in x if absolute risk aversion is decreasing. 
By the same kind of  reasoning, lr(i,x) and 7r(i,x) are increasing in x and cs(2,x) is declining in 
r if absolute risk ,aversion  is increasing (a(x) < a(x + €) for all z and all  > 0).  Finally, r(l,  z), 
1r(i, x) and a(2, x) are constant in x if absolute risk aversion is constant.16 
The application of these results to precautionary saving follows the same pattern as before. If 
absolute prudence is decreasing (q(s) > i(s + €) for all a and all  0) then —v'(x) is a decreasing 
absolute risk aversion utility function and both  a) and '(9,  a) are decreasing in a, while /(U, a) 
is increasing in a.  Similarly, if absolute prudence is increasing (t(a) c i(s + €) for all  a and all 
c > 0), then (j,  a) and j,  a) are increasing in x, while $(,  a) is decreasing in 5; and if absolute 
prudence is constant, b(Q,a), b(ü,a) and fl(,s)  will be constant.17 
The preceding facts about b*(p,  a) allow us to determine the effect of income risk on the 
marginal propensity to consume. As shown in Appendix B, the formal statement of the fact that 
0(  a) is the rightward shift in the consumption function is 
w(c, )  = w(c, o) + A(y,  w(c, o) 
— c), 
where w(c, )  is the amount of wealth necessary to induce consumption c in the face of the income 
risk . If  0* is differentiable, 
Ow(e, )  — Oui(c, 0) +  a(c, 0))  Oa(c,  0)  — 
Oc  Os  Oc' 
Note that r = r  if r and r  are constant in z. 
17  Note that ,  = '  if th and 0' are constant in a. 
11 where s(c, o) = w(c, o) 
—  c. As a result of the strict concavity and additive separability of utility, 
> 0 (i.e., second-period consumption is a normal good), so that the effect of the income risk 
on the reciprocal of the marginal propensity to consume  is the same as the sign of  .  It 
is  obvious then that the effect of income risk on the marginal propensity to consume  has the 
opposite sign from that of 2.• Therefore, if  si(s) is decreasing in s, then -  c 0 and income  risk 
increases the marginal propensity to consume.19  If  n(s) is increasing in s,  > 0 and income risk 
reduces the marginal propensity to consume. Finally if y(s) is constant, L'  is also constant and 
the marginal propensity to consume  is unaffected by income  risk. 
Further  discussion of the effect of  income risk on the marginal propensity to consume, along 
with a discussion of the plausibility of the assumption of  decreasing absolute risk aversion can be 
found in Kimball (1988b). 
The facts stated above shoot the equivalent precautionary premium  s) are redundant, in 
the sense that  looking at the equivalent precautionary premium  s) in the context  of  decreasing, 
increasing, or constant absolute prudence can only tell us that if income risk is eliminated, the 
effect on the marginal propensity to consume  is the opposite of  what happens when income risk is 
introduced.  More illuminating is the interpretation of the fact that 13(2, s) is increasing, decreasing 
or constant  as  absolute prudence is respectively decreasing, increasing or constant.  It indicates, 
for example, that in the case of decreasing absolute prudence, the amount of the risk 2 the agent 
can absorb before the reduction in saving due to the positive mean of 2 begins to be dominated by 
precautionary saving effects (or more precisely, the value of  13 beyond which increases in 13 reduce 
the wealth corresponding to a given amount of  saving) is increasing in s. In the case of increasing 
absolute prudence, this watershed amount of  risk is decreasing in s; and in the case of constant 
absolute prudence, it is constant. 
VI. The Effect of Income Risk in the Presence of Other Independent  Risks 
One possible objection to the original Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion is that it tends to 
compare risky situations with situations of certainty.  Actual  economic  agents are more likely to 
be comparing two situations of  uncertainty.  Fortunately, Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams (1981), 
and Nacbman (1982) show that the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion applies  not only to risks 
imposed on a world of  certainty, but also to risks added to the preexisting uncertainty, as long as (a) 
18  Even if l' is not  differentiable,  v(c+Ac,s)—w(c,y) =  o(c+AO)—w(c,o) + (5,'+'—e(6,') 
L  so  that 
as j1—5 and f5.(c,)fa(c,s) 
15  One special case of decreasing  absolute  prudence is the case of constant relative risk aversion,  for which Zeldes 
(1986) found this effect of iocome  risk on the marginal propensity to consume  using computer simulations. 
12 the added risks  have a probability distribution that is independent of the preexisting uncertainty 
and (b) the utility functions involved have decreasing absolute risk aversion.25  The  implications for 
precautionary saving are immediately apparent:  as long as the risks involved are independent of 
the background uncertainty and the utility functions involved  have decreasing absolute prudence, 
all of the preceeding results about precautionary saving are true even in the presence of background 
uncertainty.21 
Addressing the same general issue of an agent's response to one risk in the presence of  another 
independent risk, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987)  discuss the conditions under which being forced to 
face one undesirable risk will make an  individual less willing to take  on another, independent risk22; 
or  equivalently, conditions under which the risk premium of two independent risks put together will 
be more than the sum of the risk premia of  each risk taken separately.23  Pratt and Zeckhauser's 
most striking finding is  that a broad class of utility functions have this property, including all of 
those that are infinitely differentiable and have derivatives  alternating in sign on some semi-infinite 
interval (xs, m) (i.e., v'(x) ￿  0, v"(r) ￿  0, v"(x) ￿  0, v""(x) ￿  0, etc., for all x > rs). This result 
is immediately applicable to precautionary saving since the condition of infinite differentiability 
and derivatives of alternating  sign is one that if satisfied by v, is also satisfied by —v'. Under this 
condition, satisfied by many commonly used utility functions, the effect of independent  risks  on 
precautionary saving will be more-than-additive, as measured by the precautionary premia. 
VII. The Drdze-Modigliani Substitution Effect 
Dréze and Modigliani (1972), studying a two-period model similar to the model in this paper, 
analyze the effect of  income risk on first-period income into two components. One component is the 
reduction in consumption une would expect by looking at the reduction in utility caused by income 
risk and calculating the change in consumption that  would  result if an equal reduction in utillty 
had occurred as the result of a reduction in wealth. This they call the "wealth effect," though the 
label is somewhat confusing.  The other  component is the reduction in first-period consumption 
beyond what one would  expect from looking at the reduction in utility caused by the income risk. 
25  The basic theorem from  which all of the other results uf Kihistrum,  Romer  and Williane stem is that if v1 (x) 
is globally  more risk  arerse than t2(r), then the derived utility function  Cs(x) = Evs(z + 1')  is globally mure 
risk averse than in(s) = Ev2(r +  I') as long as either es(s) or v2(r) has decreasing  absolute  risk aversion. 
21  Ross  (2981) shoscu thar one cannot readily  extend previnus  results  tn the case in which additional  risk is a general 
- 
mean-preserving  spread of preexisting  risk rather than being distributed independently  nf that preexisting  risk. 
22  Pratt  and Zeckhauoer  look for utility fnnctioaas that gsarastee  this property even in the presence of a third 
independent  backgrouod  risk; thus their work meshes nicely with  that of Kihistrom,  Romer and Williams  (1981) 
23  If it  is equivalent  risk premia as issue, both risks must be undesirable,  but this is not necessary if it is compen- 
sating risk premia at issue. 
13 This they term the "substitution  effect." They show that this "substitution  effect" is positive if 
preferences for second-period consumption display decreasing absolute risk aversion, negative in 
the case of  increasing absolute risk aversion and zero in the case of  constant absolute risk aversion. 
In  the model presented here,  the correspondence between the direction of the substitution 
effect and decreasing versus increasing absolute risk aversion is a simple consequence of the fact 
that obsolute prudence is greater than or less than absolute risk aversion depending on whether 
absolute risk aversion is decreasing or increasing. To see this, one need only take the logarithmic 
derivative of absolute risk aversion: 
a'(x)  d 
I  —v"(x) \ —  v"(x)  v"(x) —  (19)  — n v'(x)  ) 
— 
v"(x)  ,fl—a(x)sl(x). 
Clearly, as long as we are dealing with risk averse  functions so that a(s) > 0, then 
(20)  e'(x)0  as 
Focusing on the most important case, decreasing absolute risk  aversion implies that prudence 
exceeds risk aversion.24  To put it another  way,  decreasing absolute risk  aversion implies that 
—v'(x) is more risk averse than v(z). 
If —i,'(x) is more risk averse than v(x), then precautionary saving effects are at least as large 
as the effects  of risk aversion. In particular, given decreasing absolute risk aversion, 
(21)  tb(ü, a) > ir(, s), 
(22)  *(,s)  > r(,s) 
and 
(23)  /3(I, a) < a(I, a), 
where $(i,s)  maximizes E{—v'(s + $1)J and cslI,s) maximizes EIv(s + a2)].  Furthermore, if  is 
independent of  P, 
(24) 
24  Decreasing  absolute  risk aversion  is almost  universally considered  a reasonable,  or even obligatory  assumption,  since it is implied by such behavior as investing  more in risky securities as one becomes  wealthier. (See  Pratt 
(1964).) 
14 and 
(25)  b(ü,s+P)> sr(,s+ü). 
Thus, decreasing absolute risk aversion impli that whether starting  from certainty or considering 
additional  risks  independent of background uncertainty, each precautionary premium is greater 
- 
than the corresponding  risk premium,  and the amount of a risky security an agent would freely 
choose is larger than the amount which, if forced on him or her, would require the most wealth to 
induce a given amount of saving. 
We can give a more vivid interpretation of  the above facts about precautionary and risk premia. 
5* > s  means that the extra wealth it would take  to bring the agent's  consumption in the presence 
of  back to what it was in the absence of  is greater than the amount it would take to bribe the 
individual to accept the risk Q.  Therefore, if a monopolist selling the risk  plus a certain positive 
quantity effectively  price-discriminates so that the consumer gets no surplus from buying it (but 
the purchase is still voluntary),  the consumer's first-period consumption will decline.  (However, 
if the consumer gets some surplus—that is, a bigger bribe to take  than necessary—first-period 
consumption may go up.)  Conversely, '  > ir means that the maximum amount a consumer is 
wilting  to pay for complete insurance, or insurance from a risk independent of other risks, is less 
than the amount that would have to be taken from the agent in order to keep his or her consumption 
the same despite the reduction in risk. Therefore, any voluntary purchase of  complete insurance, or 
insurance from a risk independent of  other risks, will increase the agent's first-period consumption; 
since even if the agent was indifferent about getting the insurance, consumption would increase, 
and whatever consumer's surplus the agent gets (i.e., however much less the agent pays than he or 
she is willing  to pay) also tends to increase first-period consumption. 
Finally, the fact  that /3(i,  s) < a(2, a) can be interpreted graphically as in Figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 1 shows a graph of  expected utility and expected marginal utility as a function of the amount 
A of a risky security held.  Expected marginal utility is minimized, and therefore the first-period 
consumption and wealth corresponding to a given level of  saving is maximized, for a smaller value 
of A than the one that maximizes utility. Since both E  [0(8 + Af)] and E  [—v'(s + Ai)] are concave 
functions25  of A, this means that at the amount of the risky security the agent will choose and for 
a range of lower amounts and aU higher amounts of the risky security, more of that security will 
reduce the wealth needed to induce a given amount of saving, or equivalently,  more of the risky 
2S  See Arrow  (1965), or simply differentiate  twice. 
15 security will lead to increased precautionary saving  and less first-period consumption at the same 
level of  wealth. 
Figure 2 shows these facts  in a different way.  Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies both 
that the curve A = o(i, s)  will be upward sloping  in the A-s plane  and that the curve A = /3(2's) 
will be  to the  left of A = cs(2, s).  (The curve A =  /3(2, a) is upward sloping in the case of  decreasing 
absolute prudence, but otherwise may not be.)  There is a region at the left, where the amount of 
the  risky security is low enough relative to saving that more of the security increases both expected 
utility and first-period consumption. At the right, the amount of  the risky security is so large  that if 
forced to hold even  more, both the agent's expected utility and his or her first-period consumption 
would decrease.  In the middle is a region where more of the risky security increases expected utility 
but reduces first-period consumption. On the boundary where increases in the risky security have 
no effect on first-period consumption (where A = /3(2,s)),  they always increase expected utility. 
Finally, at the amount of the risky security that maximizes  expected utility (A =  cs(i, s)), more of 
the risky security olways increases precautionary saving and decreases first-period consumption. 
In  view of the  facts  above, it can be seen that the opportunity to make risky investments 
has two possibly divergent effects on the marginal propensity to consume. On the one hand, free 
choice  about riaky investments may lead agents to voluntarily face more risk than they otherwise 
would—risk which tends to increase the marginal propensity to consume in the case of decreasing 
absolute prudence (or decrease it in the case of  increasing absolute prudence). On the other hand, 
assuming we have decreasing absolute risk aversion, the endogenous increase in risky investment 
that comes with  an  increase in wealth  will  tend to reduce consumption because of the Drèze- 
Modigliani substitution  effect, implying a lower overall marginal propensity to consume.26  These 
effects are discussed in more detail in Kimball (1988b). 
VIII. Conclusion 
Since Leland (1968), it has been  recognized  that a positive third derivative of the utility 
function indicates a precautionary saving motive—that is, that uncertainty about future income 
will reduce current consumption and increase current saving. Thus, the sign of the third derivative 
of the utility  function governs the presence or  absence of a precautionary saving motive just as 
the sign of the second  derivative governs the presence or absence of risk aversion. We have shown 
26  In the case of increasing  absolute  risk  aversion,  the endogenous  decresse  in risky investment that comes with 
an inrrease in wealth will tend to reduce consumption,  also tending to lower the overall marginal propensity 
to cnnsume.  In the case of constant absolute risk aversion there is no endogenous  change in risky investment 
due to a change in  wealth and so the marginal propensity to consume is  unaffected  by the possibility  of risky 
investment. 
16 that the analogy between risk aversion and the precaotionary saving motive extends much deeper. 
Without taking undue license, it can be saidthat the precautionary saving motive is risk aversion 
of the negative of marginal utility. 
More generally, the theory of  risk aversion can be used to study any situation of optimal  choice 
under uncertainty.  In particular,  the Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute and relative risk aversion 
have  the counterparts in the theory of  choice under uncertainty of absolute and relative prudence, 
which measure the sensitivity to risk of the optimal choice  of a decision variable. 
Some of the specific  results established about the paradigmatic case of  precautionary  saving 
are: 
(1) For additively separable utility of  future consumption v, the quantity "  is the appropriate 
measure of absolute prudence, and measures the strength of the precautionary saving motive, 
just as absolute risk aversion  measures the strength of risk aversion. 
(2) Ignoring the effects of endogenous  choice of the level of risky investment, if  absolute prudence, 
9i",  is decreasing, then labor income uncertainty will raise the marginal propensity to consume 
at any given level of consumption. Conversely,  if absolute prudence is increasing, labor income 
uncertainty will lower the marginal propensity to consume out of  wealth at a given initial  level 
of consumption. 
(3) The Dreze-Modigliani  (1972) "substitution effect" can be interpreted  very readily in terms of 
the fact the index of  absolute prudence exceeds the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion 
whenever  absolute risk aversion is decreasing,  and is less than the Arrow-Pratt measure of  risk 
aversion when absolute risk aversion is increasing. 
(4) Holding constant the initial amount of risk an agent faces,  endogenous adjustment  of the 
amount of risky security holding will result in a lower marginal propensity to consume. 
(5) If the utility of  future consumption v is infinitely differentiable with its derivatives alternating 
in sign then  the precautionary saving effects  of independent income risks (as measured by 
precautionary premia) are more than additive. 
(6) The main results can easily be  extended to the  case of independent background risk and to 
the case of non-additively-separable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility.27 
Since uncertainty is present in almost all aspects of life, the theory of choice under uncertainty 
is likely to become an  even more important part of economics  in the future than it is now. Although 
it will not answer every question about  choice under uncertainty, we can hope that the close analogy 
27 That extension  is in Appendix C. 
17 between:  risk aversion and the sensitivity of optimal choices  to risk will continue to be fruitful in 
illuminating many other responses to risk as it illuminates precautionary saving. 
Appendix A 
The Connection Between Equivalent and Compensating Risk Premia 
To see that the functions 1(z)  = x — ir(2,z) and g(z) = x + ir(2,z) are mutual inverses one 
must examine closely the the definitions of ir(2, z) and ir(2, z). If 
(A.1)  z  =  x  — ir(2, z), 
then  by the definition of ir(2, z), 
(A.2)  v(z) =  E v(z +  2), 
but by the definition of ,r*(i,z*), 
(A.3)  v(f) = Ev(z* + 2+ ir'(2,z)). 
Equations (A.2) and (A.3), plus the strict monotonicity  of v, imply  that 
(A.4)  x = f  + f(2,x*). 
The monotonicity aud continuity of v insures that both f(x) and g(z) are  also continuous and 
monotonically increasing. Portraying 1(z) and  g(z)  graphically,  as in Figure 3, one can see that if 
7rs(z,z) > ir2(2,z) for all x  so that the curve for  v5 is below  the curve for  v2,  then  the curve for v5 
is to the right of the curve for v2,  so  that rr(2,x) > 1r(2,z*) for all z, and vice versa. Similarly, 
if  ir(21, z) > ir(22, x) for all z  one  can show graphically that ir(25, x) > ir(22, x) for all z and vice 
versa. 
The qualifications  of  the Lemma  in Section II arise  because  the equivalent and  compensating 
risk premia  may sometimes  fail to exist. 
We will prove  the  Lemma  by  contradiction. Defining Is,  12,91 and 92 in the  obvious manner, 
we  know  by  hypothesis  that there is an  x5  for  which  f1(xs) ￿  f2(zo).  Now suppose  there were  an 
z  for which  gj(x)  < g2(x). If  so,  either z  f2(xs) or x ￿  f2(zs). 
18 If x 'C f2(xo), then g(x) c g2(x) ￿  x0 by the monotonicity of g.  With g2(xfl between 
two values of x  for which fi exists, the definition  of f insures that 1' (g2(x;))  exists,  and by 
hypothesis, we know that fj (g(x)) ￿  ft(g2(x)) = xt. But then  A cannot  be monotonically 
increasing between g1(xfl and gt(x&). 
If x  ft(o), then by the monotonicityof  gi, ro ￿  gs(x) c g2(z0).  This insures that 
12 (gs(x)) exists. Then by hypothesis, f2 (gs(x)) ￿  fi (gi(z)) = x. But in that case, f2 cannot 
be monotonically increasing between gs(x) and g2(x). 
Therefore, there cannot exist  an x for which g1(x) < g2(x); whenever both gs(x*) and 
g2(z) both exist, gi(x') ￿  g2(x'). 
It is easy to modify this proof to show that the Lemma is true when stated with strict inequal- 
ities and to take care  of the case of two different  risks instead of two different  utility functions. 
Appendix B 
The  Connection Between  Precautionary Premia and  Horizontal  Shifts of the Con- 
sumption  Function 
Let the function c(w, )  be the consumption function defined  by 
(B.1)  c(w,)=argmacu(c)+Ev(w—c+), 
and let w(c, )  be the inverse consumption function (giving the wealth necessary to induce a given 
consumption level)  defined  by 
- 
(B.2)  w(c(x, ü)' )  = x. 
Then in the case of the compensating precautionary premium, we want to show that 
(B.3)  w(c, )  = w(c, o) +  w(c, o) 
— 
c). 
Using the definition  of w(c, ), we have 
(11.4)  o'(c) = E v'(w(c, ) 
— c + )  = v'(w(c,  o) 
— c). 
From Table  1, the definition of  w(c, o) 
— c) is 
(11.5)  E  v'(w(c, o) — c +  +  w(c,  o) 
— c)) = v'(w(c,  o)  — c). 
19 Together with (B.4) this implies 
(B.6)  E  v'(  w(c, o) 
—  c +  + &(ji,  w(c,  o) — c)) = Ii  v'(w(c, ) 
— c + tl). 
Because of the strictly decreasing marginal utility of v, (B.6) implies  (B.3). 
Similarly,  in the case of the equivalent precautionary premium, we want to show that 
(B.?)  w(c, o) = u,(c, ) 
—  tv(c, )  — c). 
The definition of '(u  uj(c, ) 
—  c), combined with (B.4), yields 
(B.8)  v'(w(c, ) 
— c —  w(c, ) 
— c)) = E v'(w(c, ) 
— c + u) 
= v'(sv(c, o) — c), 
which,  as a result of the fact that v' is strictly decreasing, implies  (B.?). 
Appendix C 
The Case of Non-Additively-Separable von Neumann-Morgenstern  Utility 
Inthe case of non-additively-separable utility with all the other simplifications of the text 
maintainted, we can write 
(C-i)  V(w, c) = U(c,  w — c), 
where  U  is the direct utility  function with consumption in the first and second periods as  its 
two arguments.  In this appendix, we can use  subscripts to denote partial  derivatives withuut 
confusion. Thus, in terms of the indirect utility function V, the consumer's optimization problem 
under certainty is just 
(C.2)  max V(w,c), 
which has the first-order condition 
(C.3)  V(w, c) = 0. 
The cross-partial V will be positive at least for pairs of c and w on the consumption function if 
first-period consumption is a normal good, since by the implicit function theorem  = — ______ 
20 Positivity of the denominator away from values of c and  so on the consumption function is more 
difficult to guarantee, but seems likely if  first-period consumption is a normal good at any interest 
rate  and in the face  of any random distribution of second-period income.  The exact conditions 
(short of U12 ￿  0) needed  to insure positivity of the denominator are a subject for future research. 
The results of Section II can be applied straightforwardly to the nonseparable case. A simple 
modification of the proof in Appendix B can be used to show that for values of c and  so  and 
probability distributions of  that make E  V(w +  &, c) equal to zero, tbe equivalent precautionary 
premium is the leftward shift of the consumption function that would  follow upon removal of the 
income risk .  Similarly, for values  of  c and so that make V(w, c) equal to zero, this is the rightward 
shift in the consumption function due to the addition of the income risk .  The appropriate measure 
of absolute prudence in the nonseparable case is 
(C.4)  q(so c) =  c) = — U522(c, so  — c) 
— U222(c, so  — c) 
V(w, c)  U12(c, so —  c) 
— U22(c, so  — c) 
The relation between decreasing or increasing absolute prudence and the marginal propensity 
to consume  can be extended to the nonseparable case if  vi(so, c) is decreasing,  increasing or constant 
when c and  so increase in the sanse proportion as they do at the point on the initial  consumption 
function with consumption equal to c. Normality of first- and second-period  consumption could be 
helpful in yielding such a condition, since the right-hand side of (C.4) can be viewed naturally  as 
a function of c and so  — c. 
Results about the values of j3  that maximize  E  V0(so + flu, c) are difficult to interpret in the 
nonseparable case, since an optimal consumption  choice is involved  only when these expected values 
are zero.  The results nf Section VI about additional independent risks can be applied with little 
change to the nonseparable case, as long  as  the  necessary  conditions are satisfied by V(w, c) 
thought  of as a function of so. 
The analysis of the Drèze-Mudigliani  substitution effect in the nonseparable case requires some 
explanation.  Drèze  and Modigliani (1972) do address the nonseparable case, but it is worthwhile 
to draw the connection between their results and the measure of prudence given above. 
In the nonseparable case one must be careful in defining  what one means by "decreasing (oi 
increasing) absolute risk aversion." The expression 4'-"- = 422 shows the extent of risk aversior 
for small risks, since the uncertainty directly affects  second-period  consumption, and by the  envelope 
theorem, the adjustments in consumption due to risk will have only second-order effects on utility 
for small risks.  For large risks the effect on utility of these adjustments in consumption must be 
taken into account. The kind of "decreasing absolute risk aversion" needed to imply that prudence 
21 exceeds risk aversion is that 
(C.5) 
which Drèze and Modigliani term "endogenously  decreasing absolute risk aversion." By using the 
fact that the logarithmic derivative is also greater than zero, it is easy to show that this insplies 
that 
(CM) 
and assuming that V, > 0, that 
—  cww 
—  low 
w 
or in words,  that prudence is greater than risk aversion.  Similarly,  if we have "endogenously in- 
creasing risk aversion," prudence will be smaller than risk aversion. The consequences of  these facts 
for the relative sizes of risk and precautionary premia are virtually identical to the consequences 
of  decreasing or increasing absolute risk aversion in the additively separable case, as can be seen 
from Drèze and Modigliani's results. Furthermore, just as in the additively-separable case, at the 
amount of a risky security that maximizes expected utility,  an increase in the amount held will 
tend to reduce first-period consumption if absolute risk aversion is (endogenously) decreasing and 
will tend to increase first-period consumption if absolute risk aversion is (endogenously) increasing, 
making endogenous adjustment of investment in a risky security reduce the marginal propensity to 
consume in the nonseparable case as well. 
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